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Corruption in Burundi is systemic. Yet programmes aiming to
support integrity and good governance are undermined by local-
level relationships and informal practices by public agents. A  ve-
month investigation of tax collectors in Burundi reveals the rationale
behind corrupt behaviours at street level. Anti-corruption reforms
that take account of social and political pressures could point a way
forward.
Based on  eld research conducted in Burundi, I explore the
implementation gap between good governance policies and informal
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practices by street-level public employees (tax collectors, local
accountants), practices which include bribery issues or cronyism among
relatives and community members. Through corruption analysis, my work
shows it is possible to better understand the relationship between state
and society, state functioning and the importance of social norms in
public employees’ behaviour. Moreover, such analysis on corruption may
question the role of development aid, in particular the support provided to
good governance and decentralisation programmes.
Governing party’s role
Corruption in Burundi is systemic. It is used by the current leading political
party – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the
Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – as a way to maintain power. Corrupt
practices persist mainly due to insu cient controls on corruption, as
controllers (the persons tasked with overseeing corruption at national and
local levels) also reproduce the same dynamic of corruption under
scrutiny. It would be dangerous, for reasons I explain below, for controllers
to sanction in uential local leaders and much more convenient to set up
informal arrangements, which in turn generates more corruption.
The CNDD-FDD’s grip on power and the great risk for whistleblowers
posed by their peers and security services together generate a kind of
immunity for public agents and local leaders linked to the party. In
particular, the CNDD-FDD’s omnipresence in public servants’ decision-
making inhibits their willingness to oppose corrupt practices. Public
agents consider loyalty to social rules and the party to be more important
(or safer) than respecting formal rules.
For instance, when an accountant at the commune level (Burundi’s second
largest administrative division) was asked why he covered up the mayor’s
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malpractices, he answered, ‘it was too risky to oppose the administrator,
whose in uence on and support by the party would harm anyone who
tried to denounce this situation’.
Social networks versus formal rules
Burundi citizens’ weak level of con dence in the state encourages them to
accept bribery in the face of authority. As the government has been and
still is discredited by the public, loyalty is more towards social networks
than public institutions.
For example, a case of corruption was reported concerning the local
market of Kiziguro, with a goat-keeper bribing a tax collector instead of
paying market fees for the sale of a goat. A large part of the crowd
supported the alleged offender when he said publicly, ‘Theft in this country
is not new and it is not in Kiziguro that we should start penalising corrupt
people’.
This illustrates the extent to which accessing public services and
interacting with public employees is not necessarily driven by notions of
formal rights and entitlements. On the contrary, network building with
public employees helps to mitigate uncertainty and gain access to public
services. Accordingly, formal rules are socially embedded. This means
that public employees use their social inclusion (their identity or status)
and their formal authority to perform their duty and make money from
their prerogatives.
Of course, petty corruption is very much determined by socio-economic
conditions. For example, tax collectors’ salaries are so low that they argue
they have no other choice but to disregard rules in order to survive.
Besides this economic rationale, some informal practices are supported
by power games. For example, an inspector at the province level reported
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embezzlement by a local administrator. Yet, the local administrator was
appointed as a new governor and head of provincial inspection; he quickly
quelled any challenges to his integrity by covering up the report and
threatening the inspector’s family.
Solidarity ties among public agents are another key enabling factor for
corrupt practices. Tax collectors sharing informal earnings among team
members is a case example. Others are related to social ties between
public agents and their community. These highlight the different kinds of
legitimacy behind corrupt practices.
Tax enforcement investigation
An interesting task is then trying to understand how this search for private
gain is framed at the local level by social norms. The social structure
offers room for manoeuvre, but also constraints whereby public
employees must follow practices and solidarity ties related to their socio-
professional environment. An investigation into tax enforcement provides
a basis for measuring the discrepancy between formal good governance
norms and informal strategies developed by local civil servants and
o cials.
Within communities supported by a good governance programme in
Cibitoke province, reforms attempted to improve the tax collection
process. The aim was to increase the municipal budget and to improve
relations between the state and citizens.
One of the approaches was to replace ‘hill’s’ representatives
(representatives of the smallest sub-division in Burundi, making them the
lowest elected leaders nearest to the population, representing urban or
rural neighbourhoods), who were considered to be corrupt, by professional
tax collectors. Despite amendments to the existing legal and
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administrative frameworks, petty corruption continued. What is more,
these reforms simultaneously reduced the willingness of hills’
representatives to facilitate tax collection. They had less interest now to
support the tax system without the additional gains they were making
from bribes. Within a short time, tax revenue diminished as tax avoidance
increased.
This tax avoidance was directly related to taxpayers’ mistrust of local
authorities, mainly because hills’ representatives were no longer involved
in the collection of taxes. It was clear that they had been the ones
providing legitimacy to tax collection, embedding the process to social
ties. Moreover, power games emerged between unhappy, newly
disenfranchised hill representatives and the professional tax collectors,
for instance when hill representatives do not facilitate tax processes or no
longer ensure the safety of tax collectors (a job that can be dangerous in
Burundi).
Ultimately, the good governance programme supporting tax reforms had
altered a delicate equilibrium on tax consent, based on the hill
representatives’ legitimacy and the informal economy – itself propped up
by petty corruption.
A way forward
This investigation underlines the complexity of transferring good
governance norms in an environment where public employees and
citizens rely on an informal patron–client relationship to facilitate access
to public services. Programmes that aim to transfer good governance
norms must consider how formal rules are woven into informal practices.
Corrupt behaviour is a social phenomenon – far from its formal de nition,
which generally refers only to private gains and not social conditioning.
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Yet recognising this could lead to what Jackson and Köbis term ‘entry
points for intervention’, in which more relevant and localised anti-
corruption reforms are envisaged, ones in which social and political
pressures are addressed. For example, Bicchieri’s methodology is helpful
to identify and assess the rationale behind behaviours, by looking at
people’s empirical and normative expectations within a social group. This
in turn may be useful to measure and to modify the in uence of social
norms and their support for corrupt practices.
Learn more about research on corruption at the U4 Anti-corruption
Resource Centre.
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